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“Education is one of the fundamental human rights to which all people should have 
access without discrimination. It should foster respect, solidarity, cooperation, dialogue, 
consensus, tolerance, and inclusion as necessary values, celebrating cultural diversity, 
rather than covering over those differences” – Rigoberta Menchu Tum, Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureate 1992  
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Introduction Part I: Abstract 
In 2006, the State of Michigan passed Proposal 2, an amendment to the Michigan 
Constitution which effectively banned affirmative action and race-conscious admissions 
policies at Michigan’s public universities. Despite arguments that this policy placed an 
undue burden on certain ethnic and racial minorities by suppressing their participation in 
the American political process, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Proposal 2 as 
constitutional in the 2014 case Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action. This 
thesis seeks to argue for the necessity of restoring the access to political participation 
removed with the passage of Proposal 2, as well as present a convincing case that race-
conscious university admission policies continue to exist as salient policy interventions 
that minority groups should have the ability to advocate for. The following literature 
review will first explore and contextualize the policy problem addressed in Schuette. Part 
One will begin by briefly summarizing the arguments of the case through the dissent 
authored by Justice Sonya Sotomayor and plurality opinion of Justice Anthony Kennedy. 
Part Two will explore classical and contemporary scholarship on the issues of group 
rights vs. individual rights and the field’s intersection with the majoritarian democracy. 
These sources will range from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics to Kymlicka’s 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Drawing from this literature review, my thesis will move 
towards a discussion which attempts to engage the question, “at what point is government 
intervention necessary to ensure equal access to the political process for minority groups 
in democratic societies?” Following this discussion, the work will seek to make a relevant 
policy recommendation that may prove clarifying as the Court reexamines Fisher v. 
University of Texas-Austin.  
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Introduction Part II: Motivations 
 My motivations for the following thesis have stemmed directly from the 
formative experiences lived during my past four years at the University of Mississippi. 
Coming to Ole Miss, I found myself bewildered by the racialized climate that surrounded 
me. A blessing of my upbringing that I had taken for granted was the multicultural 
environment my parents had always sought to immerse me in, and the personal 
worldview I had developed as a result. Between showing goats, forestry judging with my 
local 4-H club, traveling as part of a multiracial violin performing group, and working at 
the food bank with my siblings every other week, I was exposed to a variety of 
perspectives and people groups from an early age. As a result, the fact that African 
Americans still struggled to participate fully in campus life as equals was alarming to me. 
The near de jure segregation of certain Greek houses and the de facto segregation of 
dining environments such as the Ole Miss Student Union disheartened me and I found 
myself confused about what my personal role was and could be as an agent of change. 
The fact that so much remained to be done in a locale merely an hour from my hometown 
only enhanced the immediacy of my desire to see my university as an inclusive place for 
all who chose to pursue an education here.  
 During my sophomore year, student protests erupted on campus following the 
reelection of President Barack Obama. I happened to be watching the election results 
with a reporter for the Ole Miss student news broadcast, Newswatch, when word of these 
demonstrations reached us. Wild claims of cars on fire and proverbial blood in the streets, 
communicated via social media networks like Twitter, saw us running to our cars to take 
an account of these events for ourselves. I will never be able to adequately describe the 
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feeling in the pit of my stomach standing on a hill and watching the sea of my peers 
below churn with animosity. While I found many initial reports of this incident had been 
exaggerated, witnessing the hurling of racial epithets between students, the burning of a 
black candidate’s campaign signs, and pickup trucks rolling by with Confederate flags 
waving from the windows was enough to bring tears to my eyes. This was not what I 
wanted. This was not the place I wanted to call home, nor the community I wanted to 
claim as my family. In that moment I felt infinitesimally small and powerless.  
 As so often happens at the University of Mississippi, however, light seems to 
shine most brightly in our darkest hours. The following night a candlelight walk was held 
and attendance far outweighed that of the previous evening’s events. Arriving at the 
center of campus, participants proceeded to collectively read the words of the Ole Miss 
creed. As our united voices crescendoed over the words “I believe in respect for the 
dignity of each person, I believe in fairness and civility,” my heart swelled. This was a 
formative moment of my college experience. There was healing and there was hope. I 
decided then that rather than merely espousing ideas of justice and inclusivity, I desired 
to spend my time as an undergraduate student working alongside advocates for a more 
unified campus environment. The progress I have witnessed and participated in 
advancing since that night has been the privilege of a lifetime and one of the most 
fulfilling pursuits of my life to date.  
 Of particular significance to me and relevance to this thesis was my involvement 
in the Associated Student Body’s – the moniker of Ole Miss student government – 
changing of the title “Colonel Reb,” the name for…, to the more culturally respectful and 
inclusive “Mr. Ole Miss.” The ASB is modeled after the branches of the United States 
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federal government and exists as three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. 
During my junior year I was elected by my peers to represent the College of Liberal Arts 
as a member of the ASB Senate, the acting body of our government’s legislative branch. 
While serving as a senator, I had the opportunity to dialogue with other student leaders 
about ways to make our university a better place. The product of one of these dialogues 
birthed the realization that our campus personality elections were not structured in such a 
way as to encourage minority students to declare candidacy and meaningfully participate. 
Ole Miss Personality Elections take place every fall, several weeks before the 
Homecoming football game, to elect a Mr. Ole Miss, a Miss Ole Miss, a Homecoming 
Queen, an assortment of Homecoming Maids, and those individuals chosen to be Campus 
Favorites. The elections are as competitive as the campaigns are elaborate, with as many 
as five thousand students casting ballots on Election Day. Specifically concerning the 
roles of Mr. and Miss Ole Miss, elected candidates are expected to embody the spirit of 
what is often termed the “Ole Miss Family.” These individuals normally run on a 
platform of previous commitment and service to the university and a plan to represent 
and serve all students while filling these desired roles.  
 In 2003, the University of Mississippi made the decision to remove Colonel Reb, 
an elderly white man garbed in plantation-owner attire, as its official mascot. While the 
mascot’s origins have been the subject of debate, the prevailing consensus has been that 
the iconography of Colonel Reb represents the vestiges of antebellum white hegemony – 
an ideology many Mississippians no longer identify with and find repugnant. However, 
while the mascot was done away with, the position currently titled “Mr.Ole Miss” 
remained under the appellation of “Colonel Reb.” Along with others, I found this 
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oversight to be inconsistent with the official stance taken by the University as well as the 
Creed I had pledged to uphold. It is of interest to note that the student body of Ole Miss 
had only ever elected two African American men to serve as Colonel Reb, both had 
expressed the desire that the title not be used. Simply put we began to ask the question, 
“what minority student is going to feel comfortable representing their fellow students if 
the cost of doing so requires the humiliation and embodiment of the very figure who 
historically oppressed their ancestors?” 
 Legislation was subsequently authored and we sought to pass a resolution 
through the Senate as a means of ameliorating some of the racial disparities on campus. 
We failed. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to elaborate on the many 
factors that played into the resolution’s failure, I believe it may be pithily described as a 
case of “Our constituents do not want this. This is not the will of the majority.” This was 
my first profound experience understanding that in order for democracy to work, limits 
must sometimes be placed on the outcomes produced through majority rule. We decided 
to approach the issue through another avenue and submitted a case to the ASB Judicial 
Council, a veritable Supreme Court for student justice issues. The Council heard our case 
and decided in our favor, that Colonel Reb violated portions of the ASB Code & 
Constitution, and the council issued an order that it be changed. In the days following this 
decision campus exploded with outrage. People felt their opinions had not been respected 
and that it was patently unacceptable for the Council to force such a change upon the 
community. These reactions bore many similarities to societal reactions we see today 
when SCOTUS renders a culturally unpopular ruling. Nevertheless, in the eyes of many 
justice had been served and few question the decision today. 
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Interestingly enough, during my senior year I was honored to be elected as the 
second ever Mr. Ole Miss. Through this experience I was able to see firsthand the 
impacts that restructuring had on campus health and equity. As that year drew to a close, 
I had several minority students approach me requesting advice on what running a 
campaign for the position would look like and what they should expect should they 
choose to declare candidacy. It was evident to me that, regardless of what the majority of 
students on campus desired, this had been the right thing to do. I am reminded of 
Professor Charles Eagles’ book on the integration of Ole Miss, The Price of Defiance.1 In 
many ways I feel that Ole Miss and our nation as a whole are still working to open areas 
of society that have been historically closed to disenfranchised groups. Sometimes 
changes that promote the health of society require unpopular decisions. This is often the 
position the Supreme Court finds itself in as it seeks to mediate the inevitable conflicts 
that arise in multicultural democracies.   
This knowledge must be balanced against a political system structured to be “of 
the people, by the people, and for the people”2 and the inevitable tension that results 
between for the people and by the people. The tension between individual rights and 
group rights lies at the heart of what I am seeking to explore with this thesis. When is it 
appropriate to trump the will of the majority in favor of fair treatment for the minority? I 
hope to thoroughly examine this question within the context of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in its 2006 case Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.  
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Introduction Part III: Structural Description 
 The following thesis will consist of three parts. In Chapter I, I lay out the 
arguments of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kennedy. While these Justices are not the 
only members of the Court who delivered opinions in the case of Schuette v. The 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action I have chosen these in particular for several 
reasons. To begin with, only one dissenting opinion was delivered in this case, and thus, 
it is the only one available for examination. At 58 pages, Sotomayor’s dissent was the 
longest of her career to date, over three times longer than Justice Kennedy’s. Its length is 
also one of the reasons I have made the unconventional decision to discuss it before the 
plurality ruling. Sotomayor and Kennedy discuss the same precedent cases, but 
Sotomayor offers more detail and context in her descriptions. Moreover, she takes time 
over the course of her discussion to elucidate the political structure of the state of 
Michigan and the way it affects the manner in which public universities are run. 
Regardless of the argument this paper seeks to make, discussing Sotomayor ahead of 
Kennedy provides a more clarifying foundation for effective analysis.  
 I have chosen Justice Kennedy’s opinion once again in part because of its length. 
At 18 pages, Kennedy’s work provides more substantive analysis to engage than any 
other authored by the justices ruling for the plurality. Justice Breyer’s opinion, for 
example, leaves much to be desired, covering a scant 6 pages and almost punishing in its 
brevity. Additionally, a review of other plurality rulings showed similar arguments across 
the opinions. By analyzing Kennedy, I will argue the reader is able to engage the plurality 
as a whole, and therefore draw conclusions for himself as to whether or not justice was 
done with the passage of Proposal 2.   
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 Chapter II of my literature review seeks to build a theoretical basis for the 
argument that minority groups have common goals and require the ability to politically 
mobilize towards the achievement of these priorities. Scholarship on individual and group 
identity construction will be examined as well as the modalities of injustice in 
multicultural democracies as various groups work to achieve goals that are sometimes in 
conflict with one another. Such an understanding is essential to critically discussing the 
Schuette case which will occur in the final chapter of this thesis.  
 Finally, Chapter III will return to the circumstances surrounding the case in 
question and engage two particular arguments made by Justice Kennedy that I find 
problematic. Based upon a review of the legal arguments of Justice Sotomayor and 
Kennedy, and supplemented by contemporary scholarship, I will argue that an unjust 
ruling was delivered in the case of Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action.  
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CHAPTER I: CASE ARGUMENTS 
 Chapter I will consist of an overview of the arguments made by Justice 
Sotomayor and Justice Kennedy in their delivered opinions regarding Schuette. The 
objective will be to gain and clear and thorough understanding of the circumstances of 
the case itself, as well as the arguments employed on both sides of the ruling. 
Comprehending this will facilitate my critical analysis of the case itself as well as its 
broader implications. Sotomayor will be summarized before Kennedy due to the length 
and depth of her assessment of details critical to the case. Her more nuanced look at the 
issues at hand will grant a broader understanding that will be beneficial when engaging 
Kennedy’s more concise discussion for the plurality.   
 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR 
Justice Sotomayor’s argument proceeds from a fundamental understanding that 
purely democratic societies inevitably disadvantage minorities through certain policies. 
As the second sentence of her dissent reads “without checks, democratically approved 
legislation can oppress minority groups.” This is the reason for a Constitution, which 
places limits on the decisions that the popular majority is able to make concerning 
government and policy. Interpretation of these constraints is precisely the mission of the 
Supreme Court of the United States and what Sotomayor seeks to do with her dissent, 
summarized below. Her argument consists of three parts: an examination of relevant 
SCOTUS precedent rulings, a summary of the events in question and political structure of 
Michigan, and her own critical argument against the plurality ruling based on her 
understandings of the political-process doctrine.  
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Sotomayor begins with a historic overview of the various ways that racial 
inequality was created in the United States, granting particular emphasis to the systemic 
and institutionalized racism that continued after ratification of the 15th Amendment, 
which granted African American men the right to vote. Her point is to illustrate the cases 
in which popular referendum has sought to prevent racial minorities, particularly African 
Americans, from participating in the political process. She points to precedent after 
precedent in which SCOTUS has “reaffirmed the right of minority members to participate 
meaningfully and equally in the political process.”3 Thus, when popular referendum 
enacts policy which places a unique or special burden on particular minorities, making it 
more difficult for them to participate in the political process, the Supreme Court is 
compelled to rule in such a way as to rebalance the capabilities of all citizens to 
participate in the political process. Sotomayor states “I firmly believe that our role as 
judges  
includes policing the process of self-government and stepping in when necessary to 
secure the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.”4 
Using precedent-setting cases relating to voting rights and desegregation of 
schools, Sotomayor sets up a historical context that shows the court’s role in removing 
institutional barriers that have historically prevented the participation of minority groups 
in the political process. From here she proceeds to the crux of her argument, the political-
process doctrine. Full understanding of the political-process doctrine proceeds from two 
key case precedents, Hunter v. Erickson and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 (hereto after referred to as Hunter and Seattle, respectively). 
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The rulings in these cases lay a foundation for understanding the rights of minority 
groups regarding their participation in the political process. 
In the 1969 case of Hunter, the city of Akron, Ohio had passed an ordinance to 
combat housing discrimination by assuring “equal opportunity to all persons to live in 
decent housing facilities regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin.”5 
However, the majority of Akron’s citizens did not agree with the ordinance and, through 
the process of popular referendum, overturned it. Moreover, the majority went further to 
modify Akron’s city charter, stipulating that no future ordinances dealing with housing 
discrimination could be passed without a majority vote of approval by the citizens of 
Akron. Based on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, SCOTUS ruled to 
overturn this change to the Akron charter because the change placed “special burdens on 
racial minorities within the governmental process.”6 The court reasoned that because 
extra obstacles were being placed in the way of minority groups from participating in the 
political process, those same groups were being denied equal protection under the law, a 
right specifically granted to them by the Constitution. The court went further to equate 
the barriers created by the charter amendment to the barriers that would have been 
created had Akron chosen to deny racial minorities the right to vote. The ruling showed 
that not all cases of majority rule through popular referendum are appropriate or just. As 
one opinion in the case summarized, “the sovereignty of the people is itself subject 
to…constitutional limitations.”7 
 In the 2007 case of Seattle, the Court invalidated an initiative popularly approved 
by the citizens of Washington state to end mandatory busing programs that had been 
designed to aid in the integration of schools following the Court’s ruling in Brown v. 
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Board of Education. As with Hunter, the Court found the initiative violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and placed “special burdens on racial minorities within the 
governmental process” such that it was “more difficult for certain racial and religious 
minorities…to achieve legislation…in their interest.”8  
 The rulings in these cases give us an understanding of the Court’s view of 
constitutional allocations of power. The foundation of the political-process doctrine 
demonstrates that no reallocation of power by a State or community electorate can serve 
to impede the equal participation of a minority group in the political process, because the 
equal participation is an essential right granted by the Equal Protection Clause. A pithy 
summary of this idea would be to say that equal protection is equivalent to equal 
participation. As the Court stated in Seattle “it is beyond dispute that given racial or 
ethnic groups may not be denied the franchise, or precluded from entering into the 
political process in a reliable and meaningful manner.”9 Moreover, both cases found that 
when a non-neutral reallocation of power is racial in nature, jurisprudence dictates it must 
be subjected to a different and more rigorous level of examination than other 
reallocations of power. Sotomayor finds that, based upon these precedents, the 
governmental action or political process outcomes violate the Constitution when they 
have “(1) a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit 
of the minority or (2) alter the political process in a manner that uniquely burdens racial 
minorities’ ability to achieve their goals through that process.”10 Her argument proceeds 
by applying these principles in the case of Section 26, the portion of the Michigan 
constitution altered with the passage of Proposal 2.  
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 By its very nature, Section 26 has the “racial focus” described above. The purpose 
of affirmative action and race-conscious university admissions policies is to increase 
access to higher education for minority students and thus, similar to desegregation, most 
certainly “inure primarily to the benefit of the minority.” Considering degrees of racial 
focus is important but is perhaps too fluid of a conversation to build a solid foundation 
for concrete prescriptive arguments. More tangible are transfers of power and access to 
participation. Sotomayor chooses to expend the majority of her dissent on the second half 
of her defined principle, the special burdens placed on minority groups through the unjust 
restructuring of the political process. To understand what she sees as an ineffective 
restructuring of Michigan’s political process, an understanding of its original structure is 
necessary. 
 Prior to the passage of Section 26, Michigan’s Constitution left absolute power 
regarding decisions relating to the State’s public universities to each respective 
institution’s governing board. These boards consisted of eight members and were in 
control of, among other affairs, all admissions criteria, including the race conscious 
criterion in question. The granting of this power was found in Michigan Constitution 
Article VIII, Section 5 which established the Board of Regents of the University of 
Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University, and the Board of 
Governors of Wayne State University. As Sotomayor states, by their very nature these 
boards are “indisputably a part of the political process in Michigan.”11 Board members 
come to hold office for an eight-year term via statewide political election. Sotomayor 
points out that there is significant precedent for cases in which candidates would 
incorporate their views on affirmative action admissions policies as part of their political 
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platform. Thus, candidates were able to engage voters through their views on the matter 
in question and voters were free to lobby for legislation that served their interests.  
 Following the enactment of Section 26, board members at Michigan’s public 
universities retained exclusive authority in nearly all institutional affairs, as described 
above, except for admissions criteria with a racial focus. This reallocation of power was 
achieved through statewide popular referendum by the Michigan electorate in which the 
constitutional amendment, labeled Proposal 2, by a 58% margin on November 7, 2006.12 
The process of amending the Michigan Constitution is arduous. In order for a potential 
amendment to become a ballot initiative it must garner either the support of two-thirds of 
both Houses of Michigan’s Legislature or a number of voter signatures equal to 10 
percent of the total number of votes cast in the most recent gubernatorial election. The 
latter method proves to be even more difficult than it appears as more signatures are often 
required, by as much as a 50% margin, to account for invalid or duplicate signatures that 
often accompany citizen-sponsored ballot initiatives. Costs of promoting citizen-
sponsored ballot initiatives are extreme, often amounting to hundreds of millions of 
dollars.  
 In light of the principles espoused in Hunter and Seattle, such a restructuring of 
the political process in Michigan proves problematic of Sotomayor. She finds that “while 
substantially less grueling paths remain open to those advocating for any other 
admissions policies, a constitutional amendment is the only avenue by which race-
sensitive admissions policies may be obtained.”13 She goes on to throw the conflict she 
sees into sharper relief with a hypothetical. 
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The effect of Section 26 is that a white graduate of a public Michigan university 
who wishes to pass his historical privilege on to his children may freely lobby the 
board of that university in favor of an expanded legacy admissions policy, 
whereas a black Michigander who was denied the opportunity to attend that very 
university cannot lobby the board in favor of a policy that might give his children 
a chance that he never had and that they might never have absent that policy.14  
 
 Thus Sotomayor brings the point home that the restructuring of the political 
process through Proposal 2 uniquely burdens racial minority groups in a manner that 
violates the political process doctrine. The political process doctrine does not enshrine the 
idea that minority groups are expected to come out ahead, or always achieve the 
legislation they advocate for. What it is expected to protect, however, is the equal access 
of all groups in American society to legislation advocacy, rather than intentionally 
discriminate against select groups. The precedents of Hunter and Seattle are expected to 
guarantee that all American citizens are supposed to play by the same rules in the 
legislative process. Another precedent that illustrates the vital importance of protecting 
minority rights comes with the case of United States v. Carolene Products Co. (hereto 
after referred to as Carolene Products).  
In Carolene Products, a case which centered around a law which banned certain 
types of milk from being shipped between states for commercial purposes, a precedent 
was established through the well-known Footnote Four, in which Justice Harlan Stone 
stated that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry.”15 Stone’s words demonstrate that not only should there be 
searching judicial review applied for the protection of all groups in society when it comes 
to their access to the political process, but the scrutiny of jurisprudence should be applied 
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even more intensely. It is clear that the protection of access of the minority to the political 
process is of tantamount importance for the health of society and effective democracy. 
This is the heart of the political-process doctrine. Certainly autonomy and self-
government are essential to the functioning of American democracy, but as Sotomayor 
points out through the precedents discussed above, they are not without limits, an idea 
she feels the plurality is advocating for in their ruling on the Michigan case.  
At the heart of Justice Sotomayor’s argument, and her fundamental disagreement 
with the plurality, is the appropriate course of action for ending racial discrimination in 
America. The excerpt of her opinion below encapsulates the essence of her dissent and 
provides an appropriate conclusion to this summary of her opinion. She writes: 
In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation only 
perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality that race 
matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution 
with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination. As 
members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the guarantee of 
equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the 
racial inequality that exists in our society. It is this view that works harm, by 
perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the 
simple truth that race does matter.16 
 
JUSTICE KENNEDY 
 In comparison to the dissent in this case, the judgement of the Court, delivered by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, was much shorter, spanning only 18 pages compared to 
Sotomayor’s 58. Justice Kennedy’s discussion proves less nuanced because, as he sees it, 
it is not the Court’s place to answer many of the questions Justices Sotomayor and 
Ginsburg found to be so crucial in this case. In principle, it first appears that Kennedy and 
Sotomayor are on the same page with regards to the intent of this case. In his opening 
statement, Kennedy begins by asserting “The Court in this case must determine whether 
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an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Michigan, approved and enacted by its 
voters, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”17 Beyond this stated intent, however, the justices 
begin to part ways.  
 Justice Kennedy finds that this case should not have the focus of determining the 
constitutionality of race-sensitive college admissions policies, but whether or not the 
voters of Michigan should have the right to utilize popular referenda to make 
governmental decisions regarding racially focused legislation. Kennedy uses a different 
set of precedents to analyze this case, introducing several new cases not discussed by 
Sotomayor, but also reinterpreting two of the pivotal cases discussed in the previous 
section, Hunter and Seattle. The first on this list is Reitman v. Mulkey. 
 In Mulkey, a voter majority passed an amendment to the California Constitution 
that barred the state from interfering in a private property owner’s decisions on whether 
or not to rent or sell based on whatever criteria pleased them. Within the context of the 
case, it was clear to the Court that this amendment was specifically passed with the intent 
to perpetuate housing discrimination towards minorities. The Court ruled to invalidate the 
amendment on these grounds because it served to cause “real and specific injury.”18  
 Next, Kennedy moves to examining the case of Hunter. To briefly restate our 
summary of the events of this case from the previous section, citizens of Akron, Ohio 
voted by popular referendum to overturn the City Council of Akron’s fair housing 
ordinance. The Court moved to invalidate the majority’s decision and used the political-
process doctrine as one of its central arguments. Once again, the Court moved to this 
ruling within the context of a racially-charged community where pervasive discrimination 
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was occurring. Kennedy finds the contexts of Mulkey and Hunter to be at the heart of 
contrasting the rulings of these precedents with the judgement he is delivering regarding 
Proposal 2. Yet even Kennedy points out that in Hunter, 
The Court found that the city charter amendment, by singling out 
antidiscrimination ordinances, ‘places special burden on racial minorities within 
the governmental process,’ thus becoming as impermissible as any other 
government action taken with the invidious intent to injure a racial 
minority…Hunter rests on the unremarkable principle that the State may not alter 
the procedures of government to target racial minorities.19 
 
We will recall that in the events of Seattle, a citizen vote passed an initiative to 
end school bussing for the purposes of desegregating. In this case, as in Mulkey and 
Hunter the Court saw this case as a case that was primarily motivated with the intent of 
racial injury and discrimination. Such was the climate under which they delivered 
judgement and overturned the statewide initiative. However, Kennedy believes Justice 
Sotomayor’s reading and interpretation of Seattle is flawed. 
In essence, according to the broad reading of Seattle, any state action with a 
‘racial focus’ that makes it ‘more difficult for certain racial minorities than for 
other groups’ to ‘achieve legislation that is in their interest’ is subject to strict 
scrutiny. It is this reading of Seattle that the Court of Appeals found to be 
controlling here. And that reading must be rejected.20 
 
 From this position, Kennedy moves into the explanation of his ruling. He makes 
several points but among the most significant are i) that the plurality has found Proposal 
2 was passed with “no infliction of a specific injury of the kind at issue in Mulkey and 
Hunter and… Seattle,”21 and ii) overly sanctioning the interests of minority groups 
perpetuates stereotypes and discrimination. 
 The plurality finds that the intent behind the majority vote in Michigan is not 
comparable to the intent behind the policy changes at the centers of Mulkey, Hunter, and 
Seattle. In the eyes of the justices concurring in judgement, we are “a society in which 
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[racial] lines are becoming blurred.”22 They separate this case from the precedents in 
question because “democracy has the capacity – and the duty – to learn from its past 
mistakes; to discover and confront persisting biases; and by respectful, rationale 
deliberation to rise above those flaws and injustices.”23  
Because of societal progress since the Civil Rights era, Kennedy finds that the 
“question is not how to address or prevent injury caused on account of race but whether 
voters may determine whether a policy of race-based preferences should be continued.”24 
The justices of the plurality seem to invest a faith in the American voter that our societal 
consciousness has evolved to the point that personal biases no longer play distinct role in 
our legislative decision making. The pith of his feeling appears to be that because the 
Michigan majority (allegedly) did not intend to actively discriminate or cause racial 
injury through their referendum, the outcome of their legislated decision must certainly 
have a different impact. By making this point it would seem Kennedy is equating positive 
intentions with positive impacts. That is to say, as long as the people of Michigan really 
did not mean to inflict harm, then Kennedy argues that injury cannot exist.  
 Secondly, the plurality contends that acknowledging minority interests may do 
more harm than good. Kennedy references one finding from the Court’s ruling in the case 
of Shaw v. Reno in which the Court rejected the notion that “members of the same racial 
group – regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which 
they live – think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same 
candidates at the polls.”25 The judgement regarding Proposal 2 finds it to be the 
perpetuation of demeaning stereotypes that the dissent might insinuate that minority 
groups have certain common interests on which they are united. According to Kennedy, 
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under an expansive reading of Seattle, “racial division would be validated, not 
discouraged.”26 When it comes to voting whether or not to incorporate racial-preferences 
into the university admissions process “the holding in the instant case is simply that the 
courts may not disempower the voters from choosing which path to follow.”27  
As may be seen, this understanding is fundamentally at odds with the perspective 
of Justice Sotomayor. The Court simply does not have the right to intervene in the 
legislative process to such an extent that it prevents the majority from discussing and 
ruling on certain issues. In Kennedy’s mind, intervention on the part of the judiciary 
would perpetuate the prejudices that have plagued America society for centuries.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 We have now seen the major argument for the plurality centers around two key 
points. The first point is the argument that it is racist in and of itself to acknowledge the 
potential for racial groups to have common goals stemming from their racial identities. 
The second point is the idea that malicious intent must be present in order for injury 
deserving of judicial intervention to occur. The identification of these arguments 
provided direction for my literature review and it is for this reason I have placed it as the 
subsequent, rather than preceding chapter. In this chapter, I will review scholarship that I 
hope to use to refute the arguments of Justice Kennedy. First, I will examine classical 
philosophy regarding the nature of justice when it comes to group interactions. Second, I 
will explore the formation of the racial identity within multicultural societies and 
illustrate its salience to informing policy goals of various racial groups. Moving forward, 
I will address the Kennedy’s second argument with a discussion of structural racism and 
structural violence to demonstrate that malicious intent need not be present for flawed 
institutions to impact minority groups negatively. Finally, I will take a brief look at the 
empirical nature of racial disparity in the United States.  
Aristotelian Ethics  
Nicomachean Ethics  
 Nichomachean Ethics is the primary text used in defining the field of Aristotelian 
Ethics. The work contains 10 books which cover a range of topics. Of particular interest 
to us within the context of this literature review are the Doctrine of the Mean and 
conceptualization of Rectificatory Justice. In Book II of Aristotle’s work Nicomachean 
Ethics, he lays out the Doctrine of the Mean – the idea that justice exists when all are 
given what is due them, and injustice when there is too much or too little assigned to a 
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particular group or individual.28  Later in Book V, Aristotle devises a means through 
which such injustices may be redressed which he terms “rectificatory justice.”29 When 
distribution of a good, privilege, or ability has not occurred in a just manner, rectificatory 
justice may be employed as a method of what the United Nations would call “restoring 
the dignity of the victim(s).”30 
As the philosopher presents in Ethics, injustices occur in the form of involuntary 
transactions. While Aristotle presents involuntary transactions in the more tangible forms 
of theft and assault, the concept may be applied to more abstract circumstances such as 
the deprivation of opportunity or theft of success. As our historical perspective 
demonstrated, the African American community has been the subjected to a multitude of 
involuntary transactions since the advent of slavery, some of which continue today. 
Under Aristotle’s model, involuntary transactions and injustice may be identified 
according to the Doctrine of the Mean, in which one party has more and another party 
less than their given due. In these cases, rectificatory justice is necessary and should be 
administrated by competent judicial intervention to restore what has been taken from the 
disadvantaged party. In short what has been stolen must be transferred from the thief to 
the victim of the theft. Applied to the field of race relations, we might interpret this 
Doctrine to mean that racial minorities are the victims of injustice when they are not 
given what they are due as individuals. 
Politics 
 In Aristotle’s Politics, he states “no one will doubt that the legislator should direct 
his attention above all to the education of the youth,” adding that, “since the whole 
[society] has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for 
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all…[citizens] belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of 
each part is inseparable from the care of the whole.”31 Taken together, it would appear 
Aristotle has made a convincing argument for race-conscious university admissions 
policies. Before drawing this conclusion, however, we must address a seemingly 
contradictory discussion of merit in Politics Book 3, Part XII: the metaphor of the flautist. 
Aristotle uses flute players as an example of why those who are the highest achieving or 
most qualified should receive the greatest rewards, stating: 
When a number of flute players are equal in their art, there is no reason why those 
of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them; for they will 
not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved for 
him who is the superior artist. If what I am saying is still obscure, it will be made 
clearer as we proceed. For if there were a superior flute player who was far 
inferior in birth and beauty, although either of these may be a greater good than 
the art of flute playing, and may excel flute playing in a greater ratio than he 
excels the others in his art, still he ought to have the best flutes given to him, 
unless the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence in flute playing, 
which they do not.32 
 
Seemingly Aristotle is using this metaphor to argue for the meritocratic side of the 
debate examined above. It is here that we must make an important distinction between 
Aristotle’s discussions. As may be seen from the philosopher’s Book 8 discussion, 
education is discussed as a nurturing process that grows individuals towards being 
productive members of society. As such, it is only right that educational outcomes be a 
primary concern of the legislator. In contrast, Aristotle’s Book 3 discussion of the flautist 
sets a framework of individuals who have received all the training necessary to compete 
in a competitive market, in this case the competition for the resource of the best flute. 
Certainly there will always be talent and merit differences within society. This paper does 
not seek to argue otherwise or encourage societal structure where all are confined to 
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remaining on the same playing field. However, within the framework of the flute lesson, 
this paper seeks to argue that while all may not be talented enough to receive the best 
flute, all deserve the opportunity to receive quality flute lessons. For the sake of our 
argument we will make flute lessons and their distribution analogous to the distribution 
of education capital, specifically university admissions. Here, we separate the field of 
affirmative action into separate spheres. The expressed advocacy for race conscious 
university admissions policies and affirmative action in the workplace may be seen as 
similar but different. By employing the political philosophies of Aristotle it is possible to 
argue in favor of one without an obligation to defend the other. 
Political Philosophy and Group Rights  
Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and Difference 
One principal philosophical issue that must be explored when considering 
multicultural pluralism in the context of democracy is the concept of individual rights vs. 
group rights. To some, the idea that these two ideologies can be reconciled seems to be an 
oxymoron. Certainly when taken at face value, the ideas that some rights are extended to 
all individuals while some are extended to others preferentially and yet both work to 
promote equity in society seem to be at odds with one another. Such is the problem David 
Ingram works to sort through in his work Group Rights: Reconciling Equality and 
Difference. In particular, his work offers us useful definitions that we may utilize to 
frame further discussion. 
Ingram finds there to be two types of group-specific rights, those granted on the 
basis of well-being and those granted on the basis of status. Well-being related group 
rights include benefits such as those granted through social welfare programs. Individuals 
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who are hungry, impoverished, or even homeless are granted certain rights in American 
society that all do not have access to. In these cases, well-being is the exclusive 
demarcation that determines right extension. It does not matter whether the individual in 
question is a black man or a white woman, so long as they meet established criteria 
demonstrating deficits in their well-being, they have the right to receive any number of 
benefits such as Medicaid, TANF, or Unemployment Insurance. While the proportion of 
these benefits is often a significant part of public discourse and debate among policy 
makers, the actual existence of well-being group rights is rarely debated. We see helping 
those who lack the base-line securities we have deemed essential to be our societal 
responsibility and most often find our call to such work to be ensconced in our 
constitution’s guarantee of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” However, group 
rights extended on the basis of well-being are not at the heart of the policy question this 
thesis seeks to explore. Rather, we will focus our discussion on the second category of 
group rights Ingram identifies, those conferred on the basis of inequity in societal status 
of the individual. 
Status-driven group rights stem from the base philosophy that minority groups 
often require institutionalized protections against oppression from, or domination by, an 
identified majority. Ingram names a variety of social constructs which distinguish 
majorities from minorities including differences in “race, class, ethnicity, religious 
orientation, gender, sexuality, and disability.”33 Part of social identity construction 
requires the defining of the individual against a generalized other. The process of 
categorization asks an individual to examine what groups they belong to and which they 
do not and the differences in social status that result may require particular protections 
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that ensure equity in societal interactions. Based on this distinction between group rights, 
Ingram reflects “So these group-specific rights ostensibly advance the principle of equal 
treatment. But how is this possible?”34 He finds the answer requires defining what exactly 
“equal treatment” means.  
In similar fashion, Ingram finds two definitions of equal treatment. The first is 
both simple and straightforward; equal treatment means to treat everyone the same. The 
second, in the author’s opinion, argues equal treatment means treating others differently 
“in a way that respects their individual distinctness no less than their common 
humanity.”35 Regarding these definitions, Ingram pulls them from John Rawls’ A Theory 
of Justice and Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, respectively.36 Many use the first 
definition we have identified as their basis for advocating for impartial laws, laws that 
“advance only universal interests held by any rational individual, in complete abstraction 
from all the particular interests that differentiate one individual from another.”37 Despite 
this motivation, Ingram finds that because of the nature of differences in societal 
differences, adopting a treatment strategy of “sameness” only works in some situations.  
Universal treatment is a strategy that society has pursued in many situations 
involving basic civil rights. Voting rights, the freedoms of speech and religion, and 
marriage equality represent just a few of the social justice issues in which we have 
determined that equal treatment of all individuals, or a strategy of sameness, results in the 
greatest equity. We find that to prevent the favoring of a particular religious group, we 
ask the government to limit its interaction with religious affairs, and many feel that 
because such a strategy works in for certain policy issues it should be applied as a 
political panacea for societal inequality. However, this is not the case in all pluralistic 
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policy issues. Ingram summarizes the problem that arises from treating everyone the 
exact same way, “not all persons find themselves in social circumstances that are equally 
conducive to the full cultivation and exercise of their humanity, and some…have suffered 
discrimination at the hands of other, more numerous and dominant groups because of 
their particular differences.”38 
Such disparity cannot be universally rectified without the creation of particular 
exemptions from, or sanctions for, certain group-specific behaviors. The cases in which 
universal treatment results in pervasive inequalities that fall along the categorical lines 
such as race, gender, or religion reveal to us systemic discrimination within society. 
Institutionalized domination of a minority group reveals the need for a nuanced approach 
to the extension of specific vs. nonspecific group-specific rights. Ingram sees affirmative 
action and other race-conscious policies to be a good example of necessary specific 
group-specific rights stating, 
Affirmative action rights enable women and minorities – who, statistically 
speaking suffer systematic institutional discrimination in hiring, promoting, and 
educational advancement – to compete for a fair share of scarce positions. In these 
cases, we compensate persons for disadvantages that would otherwise prevent 
them from equally exercising the same basic rights that the rest of us enjoy.39 
 
 Thus far we have made important delineations between types of group rights and 
popular views of equal treatment. Ingram further nuances the discussion my proceeding 
to define social injustice as discrimination vs. oppression. Oppression, he finds, “is 
caused by a failure to distribute basic goods in ways that promote the equal treatment of 
each person’s capacities.”40 Here, oppression relates to the well-being rights discussed 
above. When individuals are denied rights or goods we have determined to be essential 
for well-being, such as food, shelter, or education, we consider this individual to be 
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oppressed. Policies that promote or facilitate oppression are evidenced by individuals 
who do not receive and equal share of social output, be it in the form of goods or 
opportunities, despite equal individual contribution to the collective labor that creates 
such output in the first place.  
Domination differs from the previous definition because it “is caused by a failure 
to recognize all citizens as free, responsible human beings worthy of equal respect…[and 
involves] hierarchies of decision-making of power that prevent some persons from 
exercising control over their lives.”41 Ingram identifies five categories of domination: 
economic, political, legal, social, and cultural. Rarely do we find single-category 
dominations within American society, and these categories have historically converged to 
create many of what we now identify as the greatest injustices of our nation’s history, 
such as Jim Crow laws. Domination is dangerous, Ingram states because it is closely 
linked with being “denied recognition as a human being” and feeling “diminished in 
[one’s] capacity as [a] rational decision-maker.”42 The author ends his discussion by 
pointing out that, while different, oppression and domination often go hand-in-hand and 
one often facilitates the other. Economic domination through the institution of slavery 
often allowed oppression in the form of inhumane treatment.  
The sources of social injustice fall into two categories: systemic and identity-
based. As their names suggest, systemic injustice finds its origin in a system or institution 
while identity-based injustice is caused as a direct result of an individual’s identity or 
group membership. Systemic injustice does not discriminate and may affect any 
collective of individuals. For example, systemic poverty resulting from capitalism is 
color-blind, gender-blind, religion-blind, etc. and can affect any member of society. 
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Identity-based discrimination results in many of the more common social injustices 
common in the societal discourse of today such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and 
xenophobia. Certain groups are the victims of exclusively systemic injustice, others are 
affected by only identity-based injustice, while still others find themselves in the 
maelstrom of social injustice stemming both from institutions and their identities. The 
latter represents the circumstances of certain racial minorities in the United States.43  
Eliminating injustice, then, sometimes necessitates a bifurcated policy solution to 
address dual causes. For example, ensuring equal access to educational advancement for 
African Americans does not heal the wounds of racism if identity-based discriminations 
are not addressed as well. Conversely, affording a racial minority the respect the group 
deserves does nothing to address the systemic problems which keep the group in question 
locked in pervasive poverty.44 As Ingram points out, however, such solutions can seem 
confusing and difficult to develop because they simultaneously call upon our earlier 
conceptions of “equal treatment.” When individuals are treated in the exact same way, 
Ingram’s first definition, we create a solution to identity-based social injustice. However, 
when individuals are treated with difference in mind to create more equitable outcomes, 
as Ingram’s second definition proposes, we see policy solutions that address systemic 
social injustice. But how can these treatments be reconciled for groups who fall victim to 
both types of injustice? How is it possible to treat a group in the exact same manner as 
other groups yet in a different manner from other groups at the same time? 
Ingram concludes the useful definitions and framework he has developed for 
thinking through our policy problem in question by juxtaposing affirmative policies 
solutions against transformative strategies. Affirmative remedies typically only target 
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oppression by redistributing goods and opportunity in society rather than directly 
targeting the power disparities that create discrimination. Regarding affirmative 
remedies, the author states that they 
Work within the systemic and identity-based injustices of our current 
society…[and] take for granted the existence of a capitalist economic system and 
a fixed order of racial and gender identities. Thus they mitigate – but do not 
eliminate the social injustices that arise within this system and order. In short, 
they perpetuate differences of class, race, and gender.45 
 
Conversely, transformative remedies radically seek to equalize societies by dismantling 
private institutions and cultural identity constructions that create the hierarchies that 
cause discrimination. Neither remedy is perfect and both present their own unique 
problems.  
 Regarding affirmative remedies, we have already seen a significant objection to 
their implementation is that they perpetuate categorization of the individual in the social 
constructs that have caused him or her to face discrimination in the first place. They 
perpetuate their own forms of sexism, racism, and other problematic views when they 
assume that one’s group membership informs one’s desires or behavior.46 Conversely, 
transformative remedies toss identity politics aside. Biologically speaking, group barriers 
do not matter and pragmatic solutions to inequity show no regard for them. Not only this, 
transformative policies would more closely mirror communism or socialism, rather than 
the democratic political institutions we as a society have chosen to govern ourselves. 
Because of the previous concern in addition to the fact that socially constructed group 
barriers have thus far served society well as a means of organization and prevention of 
chaos, policies that represent transformative remedies are unlikely to be implemented.47 
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Ingram leaves us with a clear picture of the policy problems we face when it 
comes to social injustice. He identifies their various causes and creates a helpful 
framework for discussing their possible rectification. However, the author’s discussion 
leaves us asking several questions. Is their worth in the field of identity politics? Are all 
social constructs bad? And, most relevantly to the discussion of this paper, are 
affirmative remedies of any use to us if they represent an incomplete solution?  
 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies 
 Given the above discussion, we are confronted by an argument against affirmative 
remedies that is brought up both by Ingram and the plurality in the Michigan case. In the 
discourse of American politics and how best to represent the interests of citizens, some 
policymakers and philosophers would state that presuming an individual to hold certain 
ideological stances strictly based upon his or her physical characteristics is in and of itself 
discriminatory. Relating specifically to the topic of race, the Supreme Court stated in 
Shaw v. Reno that it was impermissible to assume that “members of the same racial group 
– regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live 
– think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the 
polls.”48 To be sure, it would be ludicrous to see a member of a racial group on the street 
and draw explicit assumptions regarding said individual’s ideological tendencies. The 
question then becomes, what is the role of race in determining the ways in which an 
individual participates in the American political process? This is one of the questions 
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman seek to address in their compilation of essays 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies. 
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Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility  
 In his essay Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility, Jeremy Waldron openly 
admits that existing in a multicultural democracy necessarily involves sacrifice on the 
part of all citizens involved. To Waldron, civic responsibility means 
(1) participating in a way that does not improperly diminish the prospects for 
peace or the prospect that the inhabitants will in fact come to terms and set up the 
necessary frameworks and…(2) participating in a way that pays proper attention 
to the interests, wishes, and opinions of all the inhabitants of the country.49 
 
If this definition seems uncontroversial it is because, as Waldron acknowledges, its 
language is vague and open to interpretation. The precise definition of what equates to 
“proper attention” and what does not undoubtedly generates a myriad of definitions 
nearly as diverse and the author’s readership. Waldron finds that the most appropriate 
place to begin answering the “proper attention” question is in the light of understanding 
cultural identity.  
 Individual identity construction begins with the recognition of boundary markers. 
Simply put, we know who we are by looking at what we are not. Defining oneself against 
a generalized other inevitably leads one to find difference and commonality with various 
collectives in the context of multicultural society. Whether artificial or natural, identity 
markers such as gender, race or ethnicity, and religion inform both our experience and 
interpretation of experience while living alongside other members of the nation state. 
According to Waldron, it is the interplay between these characteristics and the particular 
social environment, rather than the explicit characteristics themselves that inform the 
individual experience. An example would be to acknowledge that the individual 
experiences and perspectives of a traditionally conceptualized “black person” who is a 
native of Ethiopia may be radically different than those of an African-American, despite 
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their shared identity marker. To this end, Waldon postulates that “people forge their 
identities in the crucible of the nation, culture, or ethnos in which they are reared or 
raised.”50 Because individual identities are defined in the context of a social collective, 
they have a collective nature, and can be shared among individuals. Just as identity 
markers can define difference, they have the power to solidify similarity and mobilize 
individuals to achieve mutual goals. Indeed, the importance individuals place on their 
collective identities often supersedes their prioritization of their individual conception of 
the self. Waldron elaborates, stating “the most common basis for the most egregious 
affronts to people’s identities is thought to be hatred of a particular culture or ethnicity 
rather than disrespect for the particular identity an individual has crafted for himself 
within his culture or ethnicity.”51 Identity politics then, becomes a complex network of 
group interactions in which the stakes are high. The outcome of these interactions in 
multicultural democracy determines the allocation and distribution of social resources 
and opportunity.  
 
The Case for Affirmative Action on Campus: Concepts of Equity, Considerations for 
Practice 
Thus far we have discussed the potential for phenotypic differences between 
individuals to become the identity boundary markers of the psyche, leading to social 
collectives that may have common interests and goals. For the purposes of our discussion 
we have extrapolated this principle to argue that racial minorities in the United States 
qualify as discreet groups that have common political goals. The burden of proof in our 
discussion now demands we illustrate probable cause that a common political goal of 
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racial minorities would be increased representation in the realms of higher education. 
Exploring this concept is one of the tasks undertaken by the editors of The Case for 
Affirmative Action on Campus: Concepts of Equity, Considerations for Practice. 
A fact that is without contest in the affirmative action discourse is that, in 
comparison to white students, African American, Hispanic, and other disenfranchised 
students have not participated in postsecondary education at the same rates. The authors 
postulate this is the result of barriers that have prevented racial minorities from accessing 
the same educational and cultural capital as mainstream Americans. These barriers 
include “financial constraints, academic deficiencies, and poor standardized test 
performance” and as a result “certain groups of individuals have not found traditional 
baccalaureate degree education readily available.”52  
 Universities are important places because they give an individual access to 
capital, which the authors define as “an ability to generate wealth and promote means of 
production through social relationships.”53  
Rethinking Racism: Towards a Structural Interpretation  
 While race may possess psychological origins and find itself rooted in the 
arbitrary selection of identity markers, it is not merely a psychological phenomenon. In 
his paper Rethinking Racism: Towards a Structural Interpretation, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva 
argues that scholarly research has not gone far enough to interpret racism within a 
structural framework and it should instead be viewed as “the ideological apparatus of a 
racialized social system.”54 Bonilla-Silva defines racialization as the “social creation of 
racial categories” and contends that this process influences the way societies are 
structured. Theorizing the nature of these structural shifts is of critical importance to the 
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author. Bonilla-Silva addresses problems with the dominant scholarly view of racism, 
highlights the importance of what he terms “racial contestation,” and proposes a new 
interpretation of the nature of racism that he believes will help combat “New Racism.” 
 Thus far, Bonilla-Silva finds scholarly interpretation of racism has fallen largely 
within the definition established by Ruth F. Benedict in her 1942 work Race and Racism. 
Benedict defines racism as “the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to 
congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority…It is, like a 
religion, a belief that can only be studied historically.”55 The figure below illustrates what 
Bonilla-Silva introduces as the “idealist” view.56 
 
 This formulaic presentation of “idealist racism” demonstrates an understanding of 
racism as progressing from individuals’ independent discriminatory views and 
progressing to racist action. However, perceiving racism in this manner reduces the field 
to a segment of social psychology57 and proves problematic for several reasons. Bonilla-
Silva cites the work of William Julius Wilson to demonstrate that, more than a set of 
ideals, racism causes – and is replicated through – structural changes in a society. Wilson 
describes these shifts stating, 
…as American racial history so clearly reveals, racial norms tend to change as the 
structural relations between racial groups change. And the main sources of this 
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variation have been the alteration of the system of production and changing 
policies of the state.58 
 
 Merely viewing racism as an ideology limits discussion in a way that hinders our 
ability to analyze its impact on society. Bonilla-Silva offers a list of weaknesses he finds 
in the idealist perspective:  
1. Racism is excluded from the foundations or structure of the social system59 
2. Racism is ultimately viewed as a psychological phenomenon to be analyzed at the 
individual level60 
3. Racism is treated as a static phenomenon61 
4. Analysts defining racism in an idealist manner view racism as “incorrect” or 
“irrational thinking” and thus label “racists” as irrational actors62 
5. Racism is understood as a matter of overt behavior63 
 Defining racism as the collective impact of individual, psychological views grants 
immunity to social institutions from the label of “racist” and keeps the structures of the 
state from being explicitly defined by the pejorative. Bonilla-Silva believes a society 
plagued by racism retains racist institutions as a component, rather than an exclusive 
composition of racist individuals. Moreover, racism need not be considered a deviant 
psychopathology because institutions performing racist action are often rational actors. 
Finally, racism in many cases may have a covert manifestation rather than over action 
such as lynching or hate speech. A structural interpretation of racism is required to 
incorporate the contemporary realities of discrimination in a multicultural democracy 
such as the United States.  
 Challenges to the idealist perspective arose in the decades following its 
conception, but failed to take pervasive hold in academia. Arising from the Civil Rights 
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Movement of the 1960s, the institutionalist perspective found the need to separate overt 
and covert racist action. In their book Black Power, scholars Carmichael and Hamilton 
defined racism as “the predications of decisions and policies on considerations of race for 
the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group.”64 
Moving away from the micro-perspective of individual-to-individual interaction, the 
institutionalist perspective took a macro-perspective that recognized “institutional 
racism,” or “the covertly racial outcomes produced through the ‘normal’ operations of 
American institutions.”65 Jim Crow law provide an excellent example for ways in which 
mechanisms of the state were able to keep minority groups subjugated. While the 
institutionalist perspective made valuable contributions to academic dialogues 
surrounding racism, the majority oppressor group is still assigned a psychological sense 
of superiority.66 Because of these ideological underpinnings, Bonilla-Silva argues the 
institutionalist perspective does not go far enough in its departure from the idealist 
perspective, necessitating further reinterpretation in academe. 
 The Civil Rights Movement serves as one of many examples in which societal 
conflict has centered on the boundary marker of race. The ability for racial groups to 
politically mobilize has historically proven essential for the promotion of justice and 
equitable distribution of resources in American society. The Black Lives Matter 
movement makes readily apparent the contemporary importance of such mobilization. 
When the nature of social strife precipitates a “distinct racial character,” Bonilla-Silva 
postulates the action should be categorized as racial contestation.67 Racial contestation is 
defined in the literature as “the struggle of racial groups for systemic changes regarding 
their position at one or more levels.”68 Many forms of contestation in society occur on an 
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individual level, with disconnected actors and discordant action. However, when the 
nature of contestation becomes collective and cohesive, systemic changes in social 
structure become more likely to transpire. Further, in the case of racial contestation, 
fundamental change cannot occur unless “the struggle reaches the point of overt 
protest.”69 According to Bonilla-Silva, overt protest through racial contestation serves as 
the mechanism to combat covert manifestations of contemporary racism. In the absence 
of history’s overt racist action, combating modern structural racisms necessitates the 
organization of minority groups and advocacy for systemic change. Summarily, “racial 
contestation is the logical outcome of a society with racial hierarchy.”70 The figure below 
illustrates the role racial contestation plays in social dialogue.71 
 
 Moving towards a structural view of racism offers several advantages over the 
idealist perspective, as enumerated by Bonilla-Silva. 
1. Racial phenomena are regarded as the “normal outcome” of the racial structure 
of a society72 
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2. The changing nature of what analysts label as “racism” is explained as the 
normal outcome of racial contestation in a racialized social system73 
3. A structural framework allows analysts to explain overt as well as covert racial 
behavior74 
4. Racially motivated behavior, whether the actors are conscious of it or not, is 
regarded as “rational,” that is, as based on the different interests of the races75 
5. The reproduction of racial phenomena in contemporary societies is explained in 
this framework by reference not to a long distant past but to its contemporary 
structure76 
 Structurally framing racial dialogues nuances the discussion of contemporary 
racism in a manner befitting the obstacles that remain in modern multicultural 
democracies such as the United States. Bonilla-Silva spends a chapter contextualizing the 
historic progression of racialization in the United States. He begins with the conquest of 
native lands and chattel slavery, moves through Jim Crow and the Civil Rights 
movement, and arrives at the present which labels as the era of “New Racism.”77 While 
the Great Migration of African-Americans from the rural, segregated South to the more 
open-minded North allowed the “successful challenge of their socioeconomic position,”78 
previous and current disparity in the allocation of social and cultural capital has resulted 
in persistent structural obstacles for minority groups in the United States. Housing 
discrimination, racialized wage gaps, and a host of other formative phenomena 
demonstrate contemporary racism still plays a role in American society, despite its covert 
nature.79 Racial contestation and symbolic incorporation of minority groups have largely 
extinguished culturally-acceptable overt racism. The structural obstacles that remain fall 
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under Bonilla-Silva’s category of “New Racism.” The following figure illustrates the 
argued progression and current character of the racialized social system of the United 
States.80  
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In short, through Rethinking Racism, Bonilla-Silva proposes we need a less static 
view of racism. As culture shifts and the nature of obstacles to racial harmony evolves, 
we should examine the impacts of structural inequalities rather than view racism as 
merely a psychological perversion. The power of social and political institutions to 
perform and replicate contemporary racisms must be acknowledged if amelioration of 
inequities and pursuit of justice are to be achieved. Finally, understanding the essential 
functional role of racial contestation in cultural dialogue, appropriate jurisprudence 
should refrain from suppressing the ability of minority groups to mobilize around their 
existent, shared goals.  
For Discrimination  
 We have thus far traced the theoretical bases and foundations that have motivated 
minority and marginalized groups to historically mobilize. It is a fact of this history that 
affirmative action has been employed for several decades as a strategy to rectify 
disparities in educational and social capital between these groups and the majority. On 
the whole these methods have attempted to apply a salve of equity to the painful social 
wounds of racism and discrimination, and in their pursuit have met with some degree of 
success. Yet some theorists believe there is a better way to mitigate the discord between 
racial groups: colorblindness. Have we outgrown affirmative action and entered into a 
post-racial society? Is adopting a philosophy of colorblindness a viable policy alternative 
for the present and the future? These are two of the questions Randall Kennedy seeks to 
answer in his book For Discrimination: Race, Affirmative Action, and the Law.  
 “All men are created equal” are the words held so dear by the American populace. 
They represent the aim and longing – at least in theory – of our collective hearts for unity 
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among those who choose to build a life here. However, we vary in our interpretation of 
what the execution of this idea looks like in practice. Kennedy begins his chapter “The 
Color-Blind Challenge of Affirmative Action” by attaching several broad labels to 
competing ideologies of equality as they pertain to colorblindness. To begin with, there 
are those who favor the employment of colorblindness and those who do not. As we have 
seen at the outset of this paper through the words of Justices Roberts and Sotomayor, the 
divide of opinion reaches to the highest realms of power and intellect within our society. 
Kennedy breaks down the colorblindness advocacy camp further into two subsets: the 
colorblindness gradualists and the colorblindness immediatists.81 Gradualists are pithily 
described as identifying with Justice Harry Blackmun’s quote “in order to get beyond 
racism, we must first take account of race”82 while immediatists are more drawn to the 
words of William Van Alstyne:  
One gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and 
credible commitment never to tolerate in one’s own life – or in the life or 
practices of one’s government – the differential treatment of other human beings 
by race…[this] is the great lesson for government itself to teach: in all we do in 
life, whatever we do in life, to treat any person less well than another or to favor 
any more than another for being black or white or brown or red, is wrong.83 
 
Not all immediatists think affirmative action has been an inherently flawed 
practice, Kennedy points out. Of those favoring an immediate move to standardized 
treatment of all individuals, some believe affirmative action has been an effective 
intervention in the past, but does more harm than good in modern society.84 What we are 
left with is a vast spectrum of ideologies that range from “this was never a good idea” to 
“this is an idea that should never be challenged” to somewhere in between. Where along 
this continuum does justice reside?  
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 Colorblindness, when described simplistically, bears what American political 
journalist Michael Kinsley refers to as the “bumper sticker advantage.”85 “Treat everyone 
the same” is a short, simple concept – one which might be easily translated from theory 
to practice and casts off the cumbersome gradations of reconciling our simultaneous 
common humanity with innate individual difference. We see this to be a philosophy that 
has been applied by the Court for many years with varying degrees of success. While 
current societal consensus has rendered “separate but equal” to be deplorable, the words 
of Justice John Marshall Harlan in his Plessy v. Ferguson assent of 189686 ring eerily 
similar to arguments used by the Court today – over a one hundred years later – to guide 
discussion on justice in a multicultural society.87 Kennedy cites a litany of Supreme Court 
cases in which constitutional colorblindness has been referenced as a bedrock principle in 
rulings that in practice perpetuated discrimination against disenfranchised groups. These 
cases include Plessy v. Ferguson which upheld “separate but equal” practices across the 
country, Korematsu v. United States which found no fault with the domestic internment 
of Japanese Americans during World War II, and Swain v. Alabama which affirmed 
racially discriminatory jury selection processes.88 In the words of Kennedy, when it 
comes to constitutional colorblindness there is historic reason for “skepticism regarding 
the capacity of courts to suitably distinguish between permissible and impermissible 
types of racial discrimination.”89 
 While many of these grievous oversights in the execution of justice were 
corrected by subsequent rulings by the Court, it remains clear that, as an ideology, 
colorblindness can enhance rather than reduce discriminatory treatment of the 
marginalized. While broad legal principles and platitudes are necessary to standardize 
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implementation of the law in such a large country, a myriad of examples exist that 
demonstrate exceptions to these models of justice simply cannot be applied in every 
situation. Kennedy points to the words of Professor Nathan Glazer: 
General principles that mean justice are often suspended to correct special cases 
of injustice, as when the immigration laws are suspended to let in a body of 
political refugees, or moneys are made available to those suffering from floods or 
other disasters. Negroes are victims of a man-made disaster more serious than any 
flood.90 
 
What Kennedy is advocating for is an acknowledgement that strictly applied 
colorblindness is overly simplistic in its vision for a just America. While the discussion 
of whether or not the United States will ever become a post-racial society is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, Kennedy’s work demonstrates that colorblind immediatists currently 
sitting on the bench represent an invidious threat to justice across the country. At least for 
now, colorblindness also renders us sightless to the racial discrimination it perpetuates.  
 
Violence, Peace, and Peace Research  
 Thus far we have referred to the negative impacts of exclusion and 
marginalization with terms such as “discrimination” or “injustice.” However, some 
scholars might describe navigating dialogue in this manner as a conversation for 
milquetoasts. Indeed, in his work Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, sociologist 
Johan Galtung postulates that in many instances the negative impacts we have been 
discussing can, and should, be referred to as acts of violence, and for our purposes – 
“structural violence.” In his defining of violence, Galtung states “violence is present 
when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental 
realizations are below their potential realizations.”91 Summarily, violence is “the cause of 
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the difference between the potential and the actual.”92 When social and political 
institutions begin to engage in behaviors and decisions that limit, directly or indirectly, 
the autonomy of individuals in living their desired human experience, we may say that 
structural violence is present. He arrives at the following typology of violence:93 
 
 Conceptualized here is the idea that violence does not strictly refer to physical, 
injurious acts, but can take a variety of forms. Violence involves an actor, an object to be 
acted upon, and the action itself. Galtung explicitly describes social injustice as has been 
described throughout this literature review as a form of violence.94 Describing violence as 
limiting of autonomy to realize potential shows that the disenfranchisement of minorities 
and shifting of power structures to exclude particular groups can be described as nothing 
short of brutality.  
Race, Structural Violence, and the Neoliberal University: The Challenges of 
Inhabitation  
 While Galtung defines structural violence in the broad sense, a study by Jennifer 
Hamer and Clarence Lang proves instructive when we conceptualize the reality of 
structural violence in the university environment. In Race, Structural Violence, and the 
Neoliberal University: The Challenges of Inhabitation, the authors offer a compelling 
directive that talking about the existence of racial disparity neither ameliorates historic 
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discrimination nor promotes inclusivity. In conducting their examination of structural 
violence in the campus setting, Hamer and Lang intentionally link its existence with a 
neoliberal context. The study defines neoliberalism as “the economic and social 
philosophy that imposes free-market fundamentalism on all human interaction.”95 The 
authors focus on Irit Rogoff’s idea of “inhabitation” in scholarship, the study of a 
scholar’s relationship to his or her subject of study.96 The main thought is that researchers 
often conduct projects within the physical environment of academia with an outward 
focus but rarely pause to understand their relationship with these subjects as they affect 
institutions of higher education. As minorities face obstacles in American society, the 
authors find is essential that we understand how these obstacles are replicated in the 
college setting. Hamer and Lang contend that “rather than than simply intervening ‘in the 
world,’ so to speak, scholars who write against structural violence must inhabit their 
research by fostering… ‘insubordinate spaces’ that unsettle existing power relations and 
promote meaningful racial equity and access in the halls of academe.”97  
Neoliberalism in Academe 
 Hamer and Lang track the character of disparity in American society through 
black-white wealth gap origins and racialized perceptions of poverty. From the roots of 
discrimination to the rise of the black lower to lower-middle class during the 1970s and 
beyond,  
The black working-class poor have served as a potent condensation symbol in 
popular white anxieties and resentments regarding race, class, gender, deviance, 
and dependency…through this framing, black people are fashioned as predatory 
‘takers’ threatening the independence and safety of virtuous white ‘makers’ – 
hence the latter’s indifference to police misconduct in black communities…in this 
manner, race has performed the dirty work of justifying the retrenchment of the 
social safety net, promoting a reactionary white fortress mentality.98  
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 In the view of Hamer and Lang, the racial climate of American society today 
remains far from Justice Kennedy’s “blurred lines.”99 Localizing to the cultural 
microcosm that is the American university, the scholars postulate that structural violence 
is pervasive. According to a study as recently as 2012, African Americans and Hispanics 
are found to be less likely to attend or complete college despite the fact that parents of 
these minority groups were measured as more likely to hold their children accountable 
for homework than white and Asian American parents.100 Among 9th graders surveyed, 
African Americans reported ambitions to complete a bachelors or professional degree in 
higher numbers than their white peers. As the authors conclude, “the critical point is that 
successful outcomes in higher education are not simply about valuing education, but also 
a matter of resources and campus environment.” Whereas black students were already 
more likely than their fellow white students to work 15+ hours a week and take on debt to 
pay for school, African American enrollment at historically white institutions has been 
declining in the face of rising tuition rates. Such drops can have their own host of 
negative side effects for the students who remain.  
For African American students, declining numbers translate into increased racial 
isolation in predominantly white classrooms, residence halls, cafeterias, libraries, 
and the mostly white towns and cities in which many of these campuses are 
located. Predominantly white campuses can often be alienating environments for 
students of color. They are less likely to have interactions with faculty members 
who are supportive of their classroom participation and academic 
success…African American students also commonly report their experiences with 
microaggressions, or the ‘subtle insults (verbal, nonverbal, and/or visual) directed 
towards people of color automatically or unconsciously.101 
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The Evidence for Racial Disparities 
Minorities in Higher Education  
 More than ever before, becoming a successful member of the American 
workforce requires a college education. Thus, it follows reasonably that to eliminate 
disparities between white Americans and racial minorities and facilitate achievement for 
all citizens, adequate access to postsecondary education is essential. According to a 2011 
report by the American Council on Education Minorities in Higher Education, rates of 
college enrollment have increased over the past several decades among all racial groups. 
While superficially this appears to be good news, closer analysis revealed that the 
disparity between African American enrollment and white enrollment actually widened 
between 1990 and 2009 by two percentage points. African American enrollment also 
increased at one of the slowest rates when compared to those of other racial minorities 
such as Hispanics and Asian Americans.102 While whites and Asian Americans 
demonstrated a higher level of achievement than their elders, African Americans did 
not.103 With the knowledge that minorities have historically attained the lowest levels of 
education, these groups should be targeted as groups whose access must be improved. 
 
The Case for Reparations 
 An examination of the circumstances and policies that have created and 
perpetuated racial disparity in American society grants nuance to the divisions seen in the 
present day. While early policy solutions such as the Voting Rights Act of 1865 and 
Brown v. Board of Education were intended to remedy the injustices of slavery in the 
United States, new laws were often bent or broken by white Americans with greater 
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political and social capital to such an extent that conditions improved little for African 
Americans until the mid to late 1900s. Jim Crow laws, poll taxes, lynching, and other 
horrors in the American South caused a mass exodus of nearly 6 million African 
Americans to the North over the course of the 20th century known as the Great 
Migration. Migrants believed they would find the equal legal protection granted them 
under the 14th Amendment but in fact discovered they were trading one hell for another. 
This new terror was encompassed in a single word: redlining. In his article for The 
Atlantic The Case for Reparations, Ta-Nehisi Coates describes the plight of African 
Americans seeking to become homeowners between the 1930s and 1960s: 
The Federal Housing Authority had adopted a system of maps that rated 
neighborhoods according to their perceived stability. On the maps, green areas, 
rated ‘A,’ indicated ‘in demand’ neighborhoods that, as one appraiser put it, 
lacked ‘a single foreigner or Negro.’ These neighborhoods were considered 
excellent prospects for insurance. Neighborhoods where black people lived were 
rated ‘D’ and were usually considered ineligible for FHA backing. They were 
colored in red. Neither the percentage of black people living there nor their social 
class mattered. Black people were viewed as a contagion. Redlining went beyond 
FHA-backed loans and spread to the entire mortgage industry, which was already 
rife with racism, excluding black people from most legitimate means of obtaining 
a mortgage.104 
 
With the home ownership movement of the 20th century came one of the most 
concentrated accumulations of wealth in American history. However, redlining 
effectively barred African Americans from stability of such asset acquisition, turning an 
already wide wealth disparity between races into a veritable chasm. As Coates states, “If 
you sought to advantage one group of Americans and disadvantage another, you could 
scarcely choose a more graceful method than housing discrimination.”105 
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Black Wealth/White Wealth  
 In their book Black Wealth/White Wealth, Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. 
Shapiro describe the long-lasting effects of housing discrimination on the black 
community. They found that “it generally takes years and years to accumulate substantial 
wealth assets” and noted a “powerful connections between wealth accumulation and the 
life cycle.”106 African American parents who were interviewed by the authors described 
that their primary desire for their children was “to have the chance to get a good 
education, to go to the right college, and to start their lives on the ‘right track.’ Assets 
were viewed as crucial to fulfilling these desires.”107 And after centuries of 
discrimination and a seemingly endless game of catch-up, who can blame them? 
The Shape of the River 
 In their book, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering 
Race in College and University Admissions, authors William G. Bowen and Derek Bok 
empirically look at the legacies left by race-conscious university admissions policies.108 
Bowen and Bok utilized the College and Beyond database to study and observe long-term 
education outcomes for over 45,000 students with a wide variety of racial identities. 
These students all attended college at some point between the 1970s and 1990s. Their 
study places particular emphasis on the paths of minority students admitted to top 
universities as the result of race-conscious admissions policies, examining graduation 
rates, academic performance, subsequent career success, and involvement in their future 
communities. In short, their findings were that African-American students, the minority 
group given the most attention, have performed well in the classroom, including 
applicants with lower test scores that are admitted due to affirmative action admissions.  
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Additionally, the study found that in the absence of race-conscious admittance 
policies, minority enrollment, particularly African American enrollment, would decline 
dramatically. With their belief that these policies have been the stepping stone behind 
creating the Hispanic and African-American middle classes in American society, their 
conclusion is that without such policies in place, minority groups will remain 
economically disadvantaged and have fewer avenues available to them for social and 
economic mobility. An interesting finding of the study is that while these policies have 
accounted for gains among minority groups due to reallocation of educational and 
cultural capital, they have also causally affected a rise in minority test scores. In the long 
term, these policies may not remain necessary but the study finds it evident that their 
presence has beneficially contributed to the closing of the racial achievement gap. The 
Shape of the River proves prescriptive because of its empirical insights into the efficacy 
of race-conscious university admissions policies.109 While much of our analysis thus far 
has been limited to theoretical ideas and concepts, validating these concepts through 
collected and tangible data allows further analysis into potential policy interventions that 
address disparities in the American educational system, particularly the realms of 
academe represented by the field of higher education 
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CHAPTER THREE: CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
 We have now examined a wide range of sources and perspectives regarding the 
ontology and modality of racial identity within a multicultural democracy. Before moving 
further, let us briefly review the events in question. In 2006, Michigan voters passed 
Section 26, an amendment to the Michigan Constitution, via an established process for 
popular referenda. Placed on the ballot as “Proposal 2,” the amendment passed by 58% 
and prohibited Michigan’s public universities from employing any form of admissions 
criteria that bore a racial focus. Members of the state boards that govern Michigan’s 
public universities and select admissions criteria are elected for eight-year terms and have 
historically made personal stances on racially-focused admissions criteria a part of their 
campaign platforms. In the absence of ability to act on such views, racial groups are 
precluded from lobbying these public officials regarding legislation that serves their 
shared interests.  
  Proceeding forward we will utilize these references to critique the problematic 
epistemologies employed by Justice Kennedy and the plurality ruling in Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action. We will briefly return to a summary of Justice 
Kennedy’s argument to identify particular points for redress. Kennedy finds “this case is 
not about how the debate about racial preferences should be resolved [but] who may 
resolve it.”110 Such a focus is not problematic. The question of when the polity is and is 
not judged competent to rule itself lies at the very heart of Schuette. While both Kennedy 
and Sotomayor seek to answer this query, vastly different rationales lead to their 
opposing conclusions.  
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Two major ideas serve as the backbone for Kennedy’s argument. The first of 
these deals with interpretation of precedent rulings by SCOTUS, in which he finds the 
Court historically has not and should not intervene in the absence of “specific injury” 
against a minority group with malicious intent. Justice Kennedy determines that such a 
motive has been present and active in historic precedent cases such as Hunter and Seattle 
but does not find comparable purposive action to be present when evaluating the 
modification of Section 26. As a result, the decisions made by the voters of Michigan 
should not be restricted.  
Secondly, the plurality ruling determines that true racism is stereotyping racial 
groups to assume they have common political views.  As he states in his opinion, 
“government action that classifies individuals on the basis of race is inherently suspect 
and carries the danger of perpetuating the very racial divisions the polity seeks to 
transcend.”111 The conclusion in this case is that it would be racist and outside 
appropriate jurisprudence to intervene when the intervention assumes any racial group to 
possess a certain view. In the analysis that follows, we will seek to confront and 
invalidate both objections respectively.  
Point #1 
The notion that invidious policies stemming from the nefarious motives of the 
majority must certainly demand judicial intervention is without contest. Kennedy 
categorizes these policies as causing real and specific injury to minority groups. Without 
question, the precedent cases referenced by both Sotomayor and Kennedy deal with 
historic, active discrimination. Their subsequent correction is to be lauded. Our task 
remains to provide a convincing argument contrary to the conclusion of the plurality in 
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Schuette: that precluding minority groups from meaningful participation in the political 
process acts in itself to cause real and specific injury.  
 We will recall our earlier discussion of Ingram’s “status-driven group rights,” 
those assigned to particular minority groups according to various racial, ethnic, gendered, 
sexual, religious, and a multitude of other identities which may be subject to oppression 
from a societal majority. These interests seek to promote equal treatment, which in some 
cases involves treating every individual the same112 but in others require different 
treatments for different group members to “respect individual difference no less than their 
common humanity.”113 In contrast to oppression, domination is caused by “hierarchies of 
decision-making power that prevent some persons from exercising control over their 
lives”114 and may exist in many forms. Systemic versus identity-based social injustices 
refer to injustice imposed in a way that any individual can be affected (i.e. poverty) or 
because of individual/group identity, respectively. My argument in the case of Schuette is 
that the actions of voters of Michigan have removed power from the hands of minorities 
based on their particular group membership, meeting the identified definitions for 
domination and identity-based social injustice.  
 Galtung’s theories of structural violence run complementary to this defined 
framework. We will recall that structural violence is understood as existing when the 
autonomy of a group or individual is limited in such a way that full potential or desired 
outcomes for one’s life cannot be pursued. Further, such active injury is accomplished 
through an actor, an object being acted upon, and the action itself. In the case of Schuette 
we see all three functional components of structural violence at work. The people of 
Michigan, serving as the actor, actively limited the capability of minority groups, the 
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objects acted upon, from advocating for their particular desired outcomes in higher 
education through popular referendum, the action itself.  
Worth noting here is Hamer and Lang’s discussion of structural violence in the 
university setting, which demonstrates that minority groups face pervasive and unique 
challenges even when granted race-conscious consideration for admission. 
Microaggressions on campus and lack of adequate resources make academic achievement 
more difficult for African Americans than their white peers. It is evident, then, that when 
African American’s enter the context of higher education they face significant obstacles, 
yet the Michigan referendum functions to create even more obstacles for these students to 
arrive in the first place for them to get there in the first place. If the stated goal is a 
harmonious society, Schuette appears to be working backwards by creating rather than 
alleviating the structural violence that surrounds race and the American university.  
Point #2 
 Certainly it would be erroneous to assume every member of a particular racial 
group possesses identical worldviews. Intersection of the racial identity with class, 
gender, religion, sexual orientation, and a variety of other lived experiences informs our 
perceptions of the world around us and helps determine the desired outcomes Galtung 
describes. The plurality in Schuette shares this viewpoint, recognizing the human 
identities to be complex. Kennedy sees assumptions founded upon a single dimension of 
an individual as both reductionist and deterministic. In many cases, such an outlook is 
applicable and worthy of praise. A multitude of individual attributes such as music taste, 
propensity towards crime, or vocational interest cannot be traced to one’s racial identity. 
Similarly, individual ideologies, be they of political, religious, or another nature, are not 
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homogenous across minority groups. These views of the plurality have merit. However, 
our argument proceeding forward is to show that, in spite of the reasoning above, not all 
assumptions made about racial groups need be considered racist, specifically the 
assumption that minority groups desire access to higher education.  
 Returning to Ingram, we will recall his discussion of the appropriate definition of 
“equal treatment.” Ingram finds two available definitions, one advocating for treating 
every individual the same and one insisting treating all equally may not mean a strategy 
of “sameness.” The latter finds as its basis the existent differences in society and it is this 
definition we will advocate for.  
 Without question, race informs the manner in which the individual or group 
participates in the American political process. We saw this in Waldon’s Cultural Identity 
and Civic Responsibility, where he describes identity politics as a complex network of 
group interactions which determine the manner in which a society’s resources are 
allocated. Zamani-Gallaher took us a step further in her examination of racial identity 
construction. Individuals perceive themselves through the process of categorization. 
Identified boundary markers create commonality and difference between certain 
members of a society. Consequently, in-groups and out-groups emerge as the social 
collective subdivides along these categorical lines. With a myriad of potential identity 
markers, a vast spectrum of diversity emerges in a multicultural democracy. One of the 
most pronounced identity markers around the world is phenotypic difference between the 
races. Because race is a socially constructed category, and no genetic or biological 
difference exists between individuals, one might assume Kennedy’s notion of treating all 
with a strategy of “sameness” to be just and reasonable. Zamani-Gallaher makes an 
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important distinction, in her point that identities are constructed within the context of a 
given nation and culture.  
Thus, when we make assumptions about the shared goals of minority groups, we 
take into account the shared histories and lived experiences of this group within its given 
national context. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s serves as an example of a 
racial group mobilizing around its shared goals in a manner that effected systemic 
change. We will recall Bonilla-Silva’s theory of racial contestation, which holds overt 
protest by minority groups to be of tantamount importance in the pursuit of structural 
change. We cannot, and must not, question the valid and proven possibility of a minority 
group identifying a salient issue or cause and sharing in its pursuit. Moreover, because 
discrimination and disparity have a near universal affect on African-Americans, we see 
that goals relating to the eradication of structural obstacles associated with Bonilla-
Silva’s “New Racism,” in fact must be shared.  
Without collective and cohesive mobilization by minority groups through over 
advocacy or protest, transformative change in our flawed social fiber cannot be realized. 
In response to the plurality’s view, it is permissible to view the many aspects of 
individual identity as existing outside of, and independent from, arbitrary racial 
categories – this is beneficial. However, when these arbitrary categories directly impact 
and influence the lived experiences of all the individuals whom they contain, structural 
violence occurs when the ability of minority groups to choose a shared, salient policy 
pursuit is legally suppressed by the mechanizations of majority tyranny. The argument of 
this paper is that the people of Michigan created further structural barriers that tangibly 
64	
	
disadvantage minority groups by removing their access to racial contestation in a higher 
education system already plagued by racial disparity.  
Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action: Was Justice Served?  
 Moving forward from the above argued rebuttal of the Schuette plurality’s 
problematic philosophies, we are ultimately left with the question of whether appropriate 
jurisprudence was exercised in the case of Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action. The argument of this paper seeks to respond to this question with a 
resounding “no” for the following reason. The passage of Section 26 violates the 
political-process doctrine, the idea that all societal groups should have equal access to 
participation in the political process. Justice Sotomayor argues that many SCOTUS 
precedent cases have reaffirmed both this doctrine and “the right of minority members to 
participate meaningfully and equally in the political process” (citation). Examining the 
cases of Hunter and Seattle, the Court has specifically stated that policy interventions 
enacted by the popular majority that place “special burdens on racial minorities within 
the governmental process” such that it becomes “more difficult for certain racial 
minorities to achieve legislation in their interest” are in violation of the Constitution. This 
paper seeks to affirm Justice Sotomayor’s argument that Section 26 “alters the political 
process in a manner that uniquely burdens racial minorities” and agree that SCOTUS 
precedent points towards a necessary overturning of the 2006 decision by the people of 
Michigan.  
 This paper is not designed to merely match precedent and Constitutional verbage 
with a logical verdict. Instead, my argument seeks to lay a theoretical foundation for why 
the Schuette ruling should be perceived as injustice. Unjust action equates to deeper 
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issues than mere misreading of precedents and our review of scholarly research 
surrounding the subjects of race and its role in a multicultural democracy demonstrate 
this. We will recall our earlier review of the works of Aristotle and the Doctrine of the 
Mean, which seeks to restore equitable balance when restructuring or theft creates 
disparity between parties. It is the idea that all should receive their “given due.” As may 
be seen in Michigan, Section 26 represents a nonneutral reallocation of power between 
racial groups that requires rectificatory justice to restore appropriate balance and 
protection under the political-process doctrine. In Politics, Aristotle delivers the analogy 
of the flautist, advocating that while all flute players may not be equal in merit or talent, 
all should have equal access to flute lessons and education. The political-process doctrine 
serves as a corollary; while equal outcomes are certainly not guaranteed, the right to 
equal access and participation is to be defended in an equitable and just society.  
 The immense necessity of enshrining the access of minority groups to political 
participation arises when we are able to objectively observe the continuing effects of 
racial disparity in American society. Bonilla-Silva’s discussions of New Racism show 
lingering structural violence and discrimination by social institutions against minority 
groups. Protecting the rights of minorities to engage in racial contestation provides the 
channels which can be effectively employed to effect systemic change in the social fabric 
of the United States. The passage of Section 26 by the people of Michigan and 
subsequent ruling by the plurality in Schuette v. The Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action seals off these channels and prevents disenfranchised groups from pursuing the 
equality granted to them by the Constitution. In response to this ruling, we must 
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respectfully disagree and advocate for prompt reassessment of the ideologies which 
contributed to its conveyance.  
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